An Orthodox priest and cadets of the Nakhimov naval academy take part in the opening ceremony for the start of a new academic year known as the "Day of Knowledge" in Saint-Petersburg, on September 1, 2018. OLGA MALTSEVA/AFP/Getty Images

 

 

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(Un)Holy Alliance: Vladimir Putin, The Russian Orthodox Church And Russian Exceptionalism

 

May 21, 2015,12:55pm EDT

And while much attention has been paid to the growing authoritarianism of the Kremlin and on the support for Putin's regime on the part of the Russian oligarchs whom Putin has enriched through his crony capitalism, little has been paid to the equally critical role of the Russian Orthodox Church in helping to shape Russia's current system, and in supporting Putin's regime and publicly conflating the mission of the Russian state under Vladimir Putin's leadership with the mission of the Church. Putin's move in close coordination with the Russian Orthodox Church to sacralize the Russian national identity has been a key factor shaping the increasingly authoritarian bent of the Russian government under Putin, and strengthening his public support, and must be understood in order to understand Russia's international behavior.

 

The close relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Russian state based upon a shared, theologically-informed vision of Russian exceptionalism is not a new phenomenon. During the days of the Czar, the Russian ruler was seen as God's chosen ruler of a Russian nation tasked with representing a unique set of value embodied by Russian Orthodoxy, and was revered as “the Holy Orthodox Czar”. Today, a not dissimilar vision of Russian exceptionalism is once again shared by the ROC and the Kremlin, and many Russians are beginning to see Vladimir Putin in a similar vein – a perception encouraged both by Putin and by the Church, each of which sees the other as a valuable political ally and sees their respective missions as being interrelated.

The 70 plus years of Soviet rule wreaked havoc on the Church. The Church was severely oppressed, with many of its clergy imprisoned, tortured and/or executed. Parts of it were also co-opted by the Soviet state, with many clergy becoming KGB informants. (It has long been rumored that Kirill, the current Patriarch, or “Pope”, if you will, of the ROC, has KGB connections. And given that Putin served for a time during the 1980's in the KGB's Fifth Directorate, which was responsible for oversight of religious groups, it is possible that the two men have known each other for thirty years.) As soon as the Soviet Union fell in 1991, the ROC began working to rebuild its formerly dominant role in Russian society. At first, it had competition for religious adherents and for influence in the religious sphere in Russia. In the newly open environment of the 1990's, a flood of Western missionaries, including evangelicals, Catholics, Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, etc., set up missions in the former Soviet Union, and in the spiritual vacuum that accompanied the fall of the atheistic Soviet system these missionaries found fertile and receptive ground, causing the ROC to fear that its opportunity to rebuild its social influence would be short-circuited and it would be merely one of many religious bodies in Russia - not the dominant religious institution and culture shaper. In response, the ROC successfully pushed the government to pass a law in 1997 that restricted the freedom of religious practice of faiths considered “foreign” in origin and put the ROC back in the driver's seat in terms of its ability to shape of the emerging national culture.

Russian nationalism began to rise along with the spread of ROC influence in society and the diminishing of the influence of alternative religious groups. This restriction of religious freedom on the part of non-ROC groups and privileging of the ROC also marked the beginning of a trend of increasing restrictions on citizenship rights and the beginning of the slow death of Russia's fledgling democracy, illustrating that religious freedom is many times the first freedom to be curtailed by the state. Its demise is usually the metaphorical canary in the coal mine – indicating that an unhealthy political atmosphere exists and that other freedoms will soon likewise be curtailed. In terms of church-state relations, this privileging of the ROC status in Russian society marked the beginning of a political alliance between the ROC and the Russian state that has grown increasingly close and formalized under Putin and which has been beneficial to both parties.

When Putin came to power he shrewdly noted the ROC's useful role in boosting nationalism and the fact that it shared his view of Russia's role in the world, and began to work toward strengthening the Church's role in Russian society. Early in his presidency the Russian Duma passed a law returning all church property seized during the Soviet era (which act alone made the ROC one of the largest landholders in Russia). Over the past decade and a half, Putin has ordered state-owned energy firms to contribute billions to the rebuilding of thousands of churches destroyed under the Soviets, and many of those rich oligarchs surrounding him are dedicated supporters of the ROC who have contributed to the growing influence of the church in myriad ways. Around 25,000 ROC churches have been built or rebuilt since the early 1990's, the vast majority of which have been built during Putin's rule and largely due to his backing and that of those in his close circle of supporters. Additionally, the ROC has been given rights that have vastly increased its role in public life, including the right to teach religion in Russia's public schools and the right to review any legislation before the Russian Duma.
The glue that holds together the alliance between Vladimir Putin and the ROC, and the one that more than any other explains their mutually-supporting actions, is their shared, sacralized vision of Russian national identity and exceptionalism. Russia, according to this vision, is neither Western nor Asian, but rather a unique society representing a unique set of values which are believed to be divinely inspired. The Kremlin's chief ideologue in this regard is Alexander Dugin (see a good summary of the historical roots of Dugin's philosophy and of his impact on the Russian government here.) According to this vision of the relationship between church, state, and society, the state dominates, the ROC partnering with the state, and individuals and private organizations supporting both church and state. This has provided the ideological justification for Putin's crackdown on dissent, and the rationale behind the Church's cooperation with the Kremlin in the repression of civil society groups or other religious groups which have dissenting political views. And the ROC's hostility toward the activities in Russia of other religious groups have dovetailed with that of Putin, who views independent religious activity as a potential threat to his regime.

Internationally, Russia's mission is to expand its influence and authority until it dominates the Eurasian landmass, by means of a strong central Russian state controlling this vast territory and aligned with the ROC as the arm of the Russian nation exercising its cultural influence. This vision of Russian exceptionalism has met with broad resonance within Russia, which goes a long way to explaining Putin's sky high polling numbers. Putin has successfully been able both to transfer to himself the social trust placed by most Russians in the ROC and has also to wrap himself in the trappings of almost a patron saint of Russia. The conflict between Russia and the West, therefore, is portrayed by both the ROC and by Vladimir Putin and his cohorts as nothing less than a spiritual/civilizational conflict. If anyone thought Europe's wars over religion were finished in 1648, the current standoff with Russia illustrates that that is not the case.
The forceful articulation of a muscular Russian exceptionalism and of Putin's role as the defender of the Russian nation has become increasingly important to the Kremlin in the past three years or so – first as a response to the Moscow street protests that accompanied Putin's re-election to the presidency in March 2012, and particularly in the past 18 months as Russia's economic implosion has undermined the previous foundation for Putin's domestic political legitimacy. The legitimacy of the Putin regime rested, until relatively recently, on his ability to raise living standards for everyone and to enrich the oligarchs surrounding him on the backs of high energy prices that brought a flood of money into Russia. Putin's system of inefficient, crony capitalism that left the economy underdeveloped and overly dependent upon global energy prices worked as long as energy prices remained high and Russia still had fairly cooperative relations with the West. With the collapse of that model due to the combination of the sharp drop in energy prices, the impact of Western sanctions, and growing antagonism with the West, it has been useful for him to portray himself as the champion of a Russian nation beset by a hostile West determined to reshape Russia in its own image. The West's goal, says the Kremlin, is to spread liberal Western values within Russia and so dilute the Russian national character and keep Russia weak and divided. The Russian nation, therefore, must remain united behind Putin's leadership, and hold fast to its distinctive national identity. Putin has so successfully tied his fate to the fate of the Russian nation that a senior Russian government official stated last year that “If there's Putin - there's Russia, if there's no Putin - there's no Russia.” Putin's sky-high approval ratings are evidence that this message, repeated by the Kremlin controlled media and reinforced by an ROC whose reach into Russian society and cultural influence is so extensive, has been widely accepted by the Russian public.

Taking this a step further, the view of Putin as a quasi-sacral figure is becoming increasingly widespread throughout Russia. In St. Petersburg, Putin's hometown, he has been portrayed as an angel reaching out his hands and blessing the city's inhabitants. Just this past weekend St. Petersburg unveiled a bust of Putin in the attire of a Roman Emperor. Sects within the ROC revere Putin as the reincarnation of the Apostle Paul and even pray to him. Drawing an analogy between the Apostle Paul's conversion experience on the road to Damascus, this sect believes that, just as Paul persecuted Christians and then became their leader, Putin once was part of the KGB, which persecuted the Church, and he now works to strengthen it. (Although it is perhaps of more than passing interest to note that the leader of this sect began praising Putin so highly only after her superiors in the ROC asked the FSB (the successor to the KGB) to begin tailing her. After beginning her sect, the government surveillance stopped.)
The Russian Orthodox concept of the spiritual father, which encourages almost complete deference to the Church's hierarchy and clergy, is one that most Russians understand, and a defining aspect of Russian culture. This widely understood theological concept has paved the way for Russians to accept and defend Putin's authoritarianism and to see him as the country's spiritual father.

Government officials, as well as religious leaders, have been known to speak of Putin in quasi-religious terms. Vladislav Surkov, who has held various senior positions surrounding Putin, including Deputy Prime Minister, has referred to Putin as “a man whom fate and the Lord sent to Russia.”
It would not be true to say that here has not been occasional conflict between the Kremlin and the Church, nor that support for the Kremlin has been unanimous within the Church, but any opposition has been nipped in the bud and the public support of the ROC hierarchy for Putin's regime has grown even stronger since Putin returned to the presidency. Once considered a liberal, Patriarch Kirill was supportive of the Kremlin and of then President Medvedev's government when Kirill became Patriarch in 2009, but the protests that marred Putin's return to the presidency in early 2012 marked a turning point. At first, Kirill did not immediately come to Putin's aid, and even made comments vaguely supportive of the protestors' demands. After stories began appearing in Kremlin-controlled media, however, pointedly criticizing Kirill for lavish material possessions, he fell into line, repeating the warnings he had made in previous years of an “apocalypse” if Western-style liberalism was allowed to become dominant in Russia. Since then, Kirill has given Putin his full spiritual and political backing, labelling him “a miracle of God” and belittled the “ear piercing shrieks” of Putin's political opponents.

Within the Church, those who have dared to say anything critical of Putin face being defrocked and publicly humiliated. When a priest who had responsibility for ministering to the Siberian prison camp within which the former billionaire turned Putin critic Mikhail Khodorkovsky was imprisoned had the temerity to say that he believed Khodorkovsky to be a political prisoner, he was defrocked and forced to repent on his knees. Most clergy, however, appear to be strongly supportive of Putin's role as the leader of a Holy Orthodox Russia with some making no secret of the fact that they hope that Russia is on the road to theocracy.

Just how much influence the ROC has within Russian society is is illustrated by poll numbers that show that the vast majority of Russians self-identify as Russian Orthodox (estimates range from 68-90%), although the majority of these do not attend services or otherwise publicly practice their faith. In fact, a sizeable minority of Russians (polls have shown around 30%) who self-identify as Russian Orthodox simultaneously describe themselves as being atheist, illustrating that many value the Church primarily a symbol of Russian culture and national identity than as an actual spiritual presence in their day to day lives. For both those who practice their faith regularly and for those who view Russian Orthodoxy as primarily a cultural symbol, however, the Church has a deep well of social trust, and the vast majority of Russians share the Church's vision of Russian national exceptionalism and suspicion of the West. Putin has successfully tapped into that well of social trust, wrapping himself in the trappings of almost a patron saint of Russia. And because of the depth and breadth of ROC influence in Russia, the Church's support has helped to dampen any emerging unrest with his rule.
The anti-Americanism that is an important part of the militant Putin/ROC vision of Russian exceptionalism has found fertile ground in broad swathes of the Russian public, and although the Russian media, controlled by the Kremlin, plays a role in shaping such opinions, this Russian mindset is not dependent upon media stoking – the messianic sense of national identity is deeply rooted.
A Levada poll that was just released indicates a worrying trajectory among Russians: nearly 60% believe that the United States poses a serious threat to their country (a 12% increase since 2007), 40% believe that the United States would possibly attempt to take control of the Russian economy, 31% believe that Washington could actually attempt to invade and occupy Russia, and, perhaps most importantly, 36% are convinced that the United States is attempting to impose its (alien and decadent) values system on Russian society.

Some analysts have argued that, unlike during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the current conflict between Russia and the United States is based upon national interests, and that ideology is not a major factor. President Obama himself has assured us that the ideology does not play a role in the current confrontation with Russia.

However, the influential and highly nationalist role of the ROC in Russian society, the way in which Putin has moved to sacralize the Russian national identity, and the receptiveness of many Russians to this messaging on the part of the Kremlin and the Church, all illustrate that the current conflict is no less an ideological conflict than was the Cold War. The Marxist historical dialectic may no longer be a point of debate, but it is an ideological conflict nonetheless 



 A small Russian sect believes God sent Vladimir Putin to prepare Russia for the coming of Jesus Christ. Here, members work in the fields in Bolshaya Yelnya.

Holy Vladimir, Pray for Us A Russian Sect Honors Putin as a Saint

https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/holy-vladimir-pray-for-us-a-russian-sect-honors-putin-as-a-saint-a-789175.html 

Mother Fotina once led a "Center for Cosmo-Energetic Medicine," and now she prays to Vladimir Putin. Her sect, in a village east of Moscow, honors Russia's once and future president as a reincarnation of St. Paul. The group represents a rising trend in Russia, but its origins are surprisingly mundane. 

 

Von Benjamin Bidder

 

29.09.2011, 17.51 Uhr

 

 

Haggard women hike up a hill near the Volga, saying they're following "the Law of Love." The law brings them to a three-story building made of white brick, with golden turrets and a battered gate. They call it the "Chapel of Russia's Resurrection." At the gate they exchange dusty boots for green plastic sandals before spreading out prayer rugs made of foam and pray to their patron saint: Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime minister and soon-to-be president (again). They believe he's a reincarnation of St. Paul.

The followers of this Russian Orthodox sect live in the village of Bolshaya Elnya, near Nizhny Novgorod, a metropolis 400 kilometers (about 250 miles) east of Moscow. Their leader is called "Mother Fotina," a 62-year-old matron who considers herself the reincarnation of Joan of Arc. "I proclaim what God has revealed to me," she says. Just as Saul persecuted Christians before his conversion to St. Paul, she believes Putin once beset the faithful as a Soviet KGB officer.

The Soviets blew up churches, or replaced them with swimming pools, but "when he became president," she says, "the Holy Ghost came to him." Since then Putin leads his flock "wisely, just as the Apostle did."

'We've Prayed for Him to Return'
Across Russia -- not just in Bolshaya Elnya -- popular affection for Putin has started turning to religious worship. The country's top rabbi, Berel Lasar, swooned a few months ago that Russians had "every reason to ask God to bless you. Every day and every hour you do good for any number of people, you save hundreds and thousands of worlds." Vladislav Surkow, the influential deputy chief of the Kremlin administration, sees in Putin "a man whom fate and the Lord sent to Russia."

In Putin's hometown of St. Petersburg, a proliferation of posters once showed the prime minister as an angel, with one hand extended, blessing the city's inhabitants. Putin's face was mounted on a photo of the cherubim crowning the city's Peter and Paul Cathedral. Any departure of Vladimir Putin from the national stage seems about as desirable to bureaucrats, conservative elites and a majority of the Russian people as a speedy advent of the Last Judgement.

"He has the spirit of a czar in him," says Mother Fotina, clad in a black robe and a white cap. Golden butterflies and cherubs adorn her homemade altar. Fotina swings a smoking censer before an icon of St. Paul-Putin. "Every day we've prayed for him to return to the Kremlin."

Their pleas, apparently, were heard. In an act of staged self-sacrifice last weekend, President Dmitry Medvedev recommended to a party congress that Putin should replace him as a presidential candidate -- and ultimately as president -- in 2012. The 11,000 delegates and party members of "United Russia" cheered like true believers in Moscow's Ice Palace, at what amounted to a Coronation Mass.

"The people's connection to Putin is more emotional than it is to average politicians," the venerable Russian historian Roy Mevedev (no relation to Dmitry) once said. "He's seen as a sort of moral leader." Polls show 57 percent of Russians notice "signs of a Putin cult" in the country; 52 percent believe it's a positive trend.

For almost four years, bureaucrats and Russian citizens listened to President Medvedev's speeches as he campaigned for tough reforms and tried to modernize the country. Privately, though, they seemed to trust that Putin would solve any problems by virtue of his aura -- even though government corruption has flowered for years and the country's dependence on commodity exports has risen.
Mother Fotina believes the people have no choice anyway. "God has appointed Putin to Russia to prepare for the coming of Jesus Christ," she says.
In Volgograd -- formerly Stalingrad -- Putin formed an electoral alliance with the menacing name of "Popular Front," hoping "to use people with fresh and interesting ideas." State enterprises like the Russian Post (400,000 employees) and railroads (one million) have declared their membership in the Popular Front. So has the "Russian agrarian movement," which supposedly unites Russia's 38 million rural residents, and an unknown number of participants in the "first all-Russian blondes meeting."
'The New Eve'
In Bolshaya Elyna, Mother Fotina spreads her arms. Born Svetlana Frolova, she sat for 21 months in jail during the 1990s, because she embezzled money from the state as a civil servant. After that she opened a "Center for Cosmo-Energetic Medicine," and later the "Temple of the Resurrection of Russia."
"Behold, the new Eve has come to earth," she declares, referring to herself. Her followers believe that Fontinja can heal by the laying-on of hands. They believe she can pray diseases like leukaemia away. For such services they sometimes hand her envelopes, labelled "For the Love."
The Orthodox Church accuses her of witchcraft. One reason is that she competes with the local church of "St. Nicholas the Miracle Worker" and alienates pious donors. "A few years ago the Orthodox Church put the state police (or FSB, a successor to the KGB) on her trail," a retired army officer in her neighborhood said. "After that, she started to praise Putin in public as a saint -- to protect herself from investigation."
As usual, in Putin's Russia, the story is mainly about money.

Russians Are Getting Sick of Church

Orthodox Christianity—and Vladimir Putin—are at the center of the country’s newest culture war.